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Post by patrick on Jan 22, 2017 9:21:36 GMT -5
One thing I read about Mattis that I liked, was that that he would persistently ask (and presumably think) about third and fourth order effects of a given military action or operation. Quite different than the "mad dog" image. The other nickname for Mattis is The Warrior Monk because he is extremely well educated and read. |
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Post by Deleted on Jan 22, 2017 9:29:41 GMT -5
Yeah Mad Dog didn't come from him, and e doesn't particularly like it.
As for reading, here he is in his own words:
The problem with being too busy to read is that you learn by experience (or by your men’s experience), i.e. the hard way. By reading, you learn through others’ experiences, generally a better way to do business, especially in our line of work where the consequences of incompetence are so final for young men.
Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation, never at a loss for how any problem has been addressed (successfully or unsuccessfully) before. It doesn’t give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead.
With [Task Force] 58, I had w/ me Slim’s book, books about the Russian and British experiences in [Afghanistan], and a couple others. Going into Iraq, “The Siege” (about the Brits’ defeat at Al Kut in WW I) was req’d reading for field grade officers. I also had Slim’s book; reviewed T.E. Lawrence’s “Seven Pillars of Wisdom”; a good book about the life of Gertrude Bell (the Brit archaeologist who virtually founded the modern Iraq state in the aftermath of WW I and the fall of the Ottoman empire); and “From Beirut to Jerusalem”. I also went deeply into Liddell Hart’s book on Sherman, and Fuller’s book on Alexander the Great got a lot of my attention (although I never imagined that my HQ would end up only 500 meters from where he lay in state in Babylon).
Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun.
For all the “4th Generation of War” intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc, I must respectfully say … “Not really”: Alex the Great would not be in the least bit perplexed by the enemy that we face right now in Iraq, and our leaders going into this fight do their troops a disservice by not studying (studying, vice just reading) the men who have gone before us.
We have been fighting on this planet for 5000 years and we should take advantage of their experience. “Winging it” and filling body bags as we sort out what works reminds us of the moral dictates and the cost of incompetence in our profession. As commanders and staff officers, we are coaches and sentries for our units: how can we coach anything if we don’t know a hell of a lot more than just the [Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures]? What happens when you’re on a dynamic battlefield and things are changing faster than higher [Headquarters] can stay abreast? Do you not adapt because you cannot conceptualize faster than the enemy’s adaptation? (Darwin has a pretty good theory about the outcome for those who cannot adapt to changing circumstance — in the information age things can change rather abruptly and at warp speed, especially the moral high ground which our regimented thinkers cede far too quickly in our recent fights.) And how can you be a sentinel and not have your unit caught flat-footed if you don’t know what the warning signs are — that your unit’s preps are not sufficient for the specifics of a tasking that you have not anticipated?
Perhaps if you are in support functions waiting on the warfighters to spell out the specifics of what you are to do, you can avoid the consequences of not reading. Those who must adapt to overcoming an independent enemy’s will are not allowed that luxury.
This is not new to the USMC approach to warfighting — Going into Kuwait 12 years ago, I read (and reread) Rommel’s Papers (remember “Kampstaffel”?), Montgomery’s book (“Eyes Officers”…), “Grant Takes Command” (need for commanders to get along, “commanders’ relationships” being more important than “command relationships”), and some others.
As a result, the enemy has paid when I had the opportunity to go against them, and I believe that many of my young guys lived because I didn’t waste their lives because I didn’t have the vision in my mind of how to destroy the enemy at least cost to our guys and to the innocents on the battlefields.
Hope this answers your question…. I will cc my ADC in the event he can add to this. He is the only officer I know who has read more than I.
Semper Fi, Mattis
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Post by Deleted on Jan 22, 2017 9:31:25 GMT -5
Hey Rumsfeld, this bears repeating: “Winging it” and filling body bags as we sort out what works reminds us of the moral dictates and the cost of incompetence in our profession."  |
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Post by patrick on Jan 22, 2017 9:41:05 GMT -5
Evan, the genesis of Hezbollah was the Iranian Revolution. Reagan didn't help by sending 1500 sacrificial lambs into a chaotic situation that we grossly misunderstood. Consider that Eisenhower sent 15,000 soldiers and marines into Lebanon for six months in 1958 for what was still largely an internal conflict between the Maronites (Christians, just like the Mafia are...) and the Druze. Reagan sent 1,500 into what was a much more complex crucible. By 1982, the PLO were in Lebanon. Syrians were in Lebanon. Iranians were in Lebanon. Israel had already invaded Lebanon once in 1976 to stop PLO attacks. Here we go traipsing in with 1500, partly because we thought the Soviets had designs in Lebanon, which they didn't. That's reductionist thinking gone nuts, coupled with a distinct lack of understanding of local issues, but sadly par for the course up to 2017. One minor quibble. Hezbullah was founded explicitly as a reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The Shia in Lebanon have always got the shitty end of the stick, especially from the PLO, so when they first invaded they were greeted as liberators by the Shia (kind of like when the British first went into N. Ireland, they were there to protect the Catholics). But Israel's real mission wasn't to simply defeat the PLO then leave, it was to colonize southern Lebanon and annex it to Israel, so THEY started abusing the Shia. Hezullah says its mission is to drive foreigners out of Lebanon, whoever they are. The Americans were foreigners, so... |
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Post by aquaduct on Jan 22, 2017 13:13:40 GMT -5
Maybe it's because I'm the only one here with experience working with and in the actual bureaucracy in Washington, but I see things much differently. DC exists in an empty intellectual bubble born of a complete absence of practical experience with anything they oversee. They debate "policy" in the absence of any understanding of how the world actually works. I beg to differ on every one of these points, especially the first. Time will tell- just like the election. |
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Post by Deleted on Jan 22, 2017 13:19:07 GMT -5
Patrick,
I was looking more at the conditions writ large that led to Hezbollah.
No PLO in Lebanon, for instance, then no need for Israel to invade twice in 6 years. That's just one of many interwoven factors.
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Post by fauxmaha on Jan 22, 2017 14:59:32 GMT -5
In a nation of rent-seekers, it's no wonder that the new landlord is freaking them out.
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Post by patrick on Jan 22, 2017 22:52:57 GMT -5
Patrick, I was looking more at the conditions writ large that led to Hezbollah. No PLO in Lebanon, for instance, then no need for Israel to invade twice in 6 years. That's just one of many interwoven factors. I like that phrase, "interwoven factors." A lot of people try to simplify the Middle East into one or two individual causes to explain everything. Thinking of history, especially in an area like the middle east, as a tapestry, is probably more productive. |
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